Tax Treatment of Covenants Not to Compete: A Problem of Purchase Price Allocation by unknown
TAX TREATMENT OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE:
A PROBLEM OF PURCHASE PRICE ALLOCATION*
CONFLICTING tax interests of the vendor and vendee of a going business
influence the amount of purchase price allocated to goodwill rather than to an
accompanying covenant not to compete.' Embracing reputation. and customer
loyalty, goodwill 2 may rest largely on the owner's individual personality or
skill and, after sale of the business, its retention may therefore depend upon
the purchaser obtaining a promise from the seller not to open a competing
business.3 Since an excess of purchase price over the value of all tangible and
*Richard Ullman, 29 T.C. 129 (1957).
1. In addition to the physical assets, the purchaser of a going business generally ac-
quires goodwill, which may be an important source of earning power. When goodwill is
based primarily on general reputation of the business rather than personal qualities of the
proprietor, the purchaser ordinarily has little difficulty obtaining the benefits of the firm's
good name. Many customers may, however, be attracted by an individual proprietor and will
not necessarily patronize his successor. Frequently, the purchaser's ability to retain the
seller's goodwill depends upon the seller's withdrawal from competition; accordingly, the
seller's covenant not to compete often accompanies the sale of a personalized business.
See, generally, 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1385 (1951) ; Carpenter, Validity of Covenants
Not To Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 244 (1928); Taylor, Covenants Not To Compete:
Consulting Arrangements, Adjustments to Purchase Price, N.Y.U. 12 TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 1047 (1954).
2. "The good-will, which has been the subject of sale, is nothing more than the prob-
ability, that the old customers will resort to the old place." Lord Eldon in Cruttwell v.
Lye, 17 Ves. Jun. 335, 346, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (Ch. 1810). This definition, taken from
the earliest reported judicial pronouncement on goodwill, has been expanded to include
any competitive advantage which attaches to a particular business and is transferable. See
YANG, GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLES 21-26, 23 (1927) ; Raby, Good Will on Chang-
ing From a Corporate to Noncorporate Forn, 30 TAXES 623, 624 (1952). The basic
acknowledged concepts of goodwill are industrial goodwill (harmonious labor relations),
financial goodwill (ability to obtain credit and venture capital), and consumer goodwill.
See YANG, op. cit. supra at 26-37, 47-56; Note, 62 YALE L.J. 640, 640-41 -n.1 (1953). Con-
sumer goodwill includes favorable customer attitudes, general reputation, customer lists,
prospective patronage and symbols invoking consumer response. See Note, An, Inquiry Into
the Nature of Goodwill, 53 CoLuM. L. Rxv. 660, 664-65 & nn.5-8 (1953) (hereinafter cited
as INQUIRY INTO GOODWILL) ; cf. Berman, Valuation of Anidties, Business Interests, Copy-
rights, Good Will, Life Insurance Policies, Patents, Trade Marks and Trust Interests for
Fedcral Tax Purposes, 58 DICK. L. REV. 58 (1953). Some major sources of consumer
goodwill include type of service, established connections, quality of goods and location. See
YANG, op. cit. supra at 41-45. On goodwill generally, see LEAKE, CO-MMERCIAL GOODWILL
(4th ed. 1948) ; MOORE, LEGAL PROTECriON OF GOODWILL (1936) ; INQUIRy INTO GOODWILL.
3. Covenants not to compete have accompanied transfers of the following types of
business. Accounting Practice: Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th
Cir. 1956); Jacques L. Ach, P-H 1954 T.C. Mfem. Dec. ff 54349; Richard S. Wyler, 14
T.C. 1251 (1950); Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949). Bakery: D & H Bagel
Bakery, Inc., P-H 1955 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1f 55100. Dry Cleaning: Andrew Newman, Inc.,
P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57224. Insurance Agency: Dauksch v. Busey, 125 F. Supp.
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identifiable intangible assets must be attributed either to goodwill or the cove-
nant,4 pricing the covenant is primarily a task of apportionment between it
and goodwill rather than of valuing the covenant alone.5 The vendor, seeking
capital gains, will demand a high price for goodwill-a capital asset ---and a
correspondingly low price for the covenant-taxable as ordinary income.7 The
vendee, on the other hand, prefers a high basis for the covenant S which, unlike
goodwill, has a limited life furnishing depreciation deductions. 9
130 (S.D. Ohio 1954); Lloyd H. Walker, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. f1 54177; R. Bryson
Jones, 17 B.T.A. 1213 (1929). Laundry and Linen Service: Joseph Faulkner, P-H 1956
T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 56039; Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949). Newspaper Publishing:
Commissioner v. Gazette Tel. Co., 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Toledo Blade Co. v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950) ; George H.
Payne, 22 T.C. 526 (1954). Radio Station: Radio Medford, Inc. v. United States, 150
F. Supp. 641 (D. Ore. 1957). Restaurant: Sidney Alper, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 156271;
J. S. L. Restaurants, Inc., P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. I[ 51056. Tissue Products: Frances
Silberman, 22 T.C. 1240 (1954).
4. Goodwill represents that part of the value of a business which cannot be allocated
elsewhere. It may be measured by capitalizing the excess of the business's profits over a
normal return from the tangible and identifiable intangible assets. See FINNEY &I MILLER,
PRINCIPLES or ACCOUNTING--INTERAEDIATE 496-97 (4th ed. 1951) (hereinafter cited as
FINNEY & MILLER) ; INQUIRY INTO GOODWILL 677-79. This usual accounting definition
of goodwill provides a quantitative measure of the worth of the business's qualitative good-
will. See note 2 supra. Although the exact amount varies with the individuals concerned,
a "normal" return is defined as "the amount which would attract proprietorship capital
equal to the agreed valuation of the net assets other than goodwill." FINNEY & MILLER
502. Identifiable intangible assets may include franchises, patents, copyrights, leases and
trademarks. See YANG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 57-86. For pertinent considerations in
capitalizing and computing excess value to determine goodwill, see FINNEY & MILLER
497-502.
5. The price paid for a business will represent the value of its identifiable assets plus
goodwill. See note 4 supra. Hence, when a covenant not to compete accompanies the pur-
chase, the parties can raise or lower the value placed on the covenant by allocating cor-
responding amounts to goodwill. Cf. Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143, 148 (1949).
6. "Good will is a capital asset and any gains resulting from the sale thereof are
capital gains." Id. at 149. See Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17, 19 (1949).
7. See, e.g., Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954).
If the vendor were to sell his stock at a loss, he would still attempt to minimize the
amount allocated to the covenant against which he cannot offset his capital loss. Only if
the vendor's annual taxable income were less than $1,000 for the taxable year and the five
succeeding years would he be indifferent to treatment accorded the covenant. See INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1211, 1212. The same reasoning holds true for a sole proprietor
selling at a loss except that if sale of his § 1231. assets results in a net loss on those assets,
he would be indifferent to receiving ordinary income on his covenant because it will be
offset by the ordinary loss attributed to his § 1231 assets. See INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
In the economic situation in which sale at a loss occurs, a covenant not to compete may
welf be unnecessary.
8. See Commissioner v. Gazette Tel. Co., 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) (covenant
one fourth of total sales price) ; Dauksch v. Busey, 125 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Ohio 1954)
(two thirds) ; Andrew Newman, Inc., P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 57224 (three fifths) ;
J. S. L. Restaurants, Inc., P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 51056 (five eighths); Toledo
Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948), aff'd, 180 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811
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Similarly, when an incorporated business is transferred through sale of cor-
porate stock, goodwill represents that part of the stock's value not allocable to
any specific asset.'0 A low price on a selling shareholder's covenant will there-
fore permit a high allocation to the stock with attendant capital gains for the
vendor-shareholder." Because stock is nondepreciable 12 and resale ordinarily
is not contemplated, the vendee, obtaining no immediate tax benefit from a high
basis for stock, will prefer a large allocation to the depreciable covenant.' 3 In
any event, whatever the price agreed upon when a business is transferred
through sale of stock, inclusion of a separate covenant from the selling share-
holder automatically deprives him of capital gains to the extent of the price of
the covenant.
4
(1950) (approximately eight ninths) ; Carboloy Co., P-H 1943 T.C. Mem. Dec. 11 43325
(at least ten elevenths) ; Eitington-Schild Co., 21 B.T.A. 1163 (1931.) (approximately one
half).
9. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gazette Tel. Co., supra note 8; 4 MERTENs, FEERAL
INcoM TAXATION § 23.68 (rev. ed. 1954) (collecting cases) (hereinafter cited as MER-
TENS).
A large allocation to the covenant is necessary for the vendee to avoid having a large
outlay tied up in goodwill, the useful life of which cannot be estimated with sufficient
certainty to justify depreciation. See, e.g., Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d
626, 632-33 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927); cf. Clarke v. Haberle
Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930). No deduction for depreciation is
allowable with respect to goodwill. BITrKER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFr TAXA-
TION 276-77 nn. 1, 2 (1955). Depreciation deductions for goodwill are disallowed because
of difficulty in determining when and to what extent they become exhausted in use. See
4 *MERTENS § 23.10, at 23-24 n.46 (collecting cases) ; INQUIRY INTO GOODwILL 725. This rule
has been severely criticized and depreciation deductions advocated whenever the life of
the business and/or the goodwill is ascertainable. See Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs
Brewing Co., supra (brewery's existence was to be terminated due to Prohibition Act;
goodwill deduction disallowed). Moreover some elements of goodwill may have a deter-
minable, exhaustible life and should be depreciable. See AmERICAN INSTITUTE OF Ac-
CO)UNTANTS, RESTATEMENT AND REvIsION OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS 37-39
(1953). Since goodwill is measured by capitalization of excess profits, see note 4 supra,
many accountants feel that purchased goodwill should be amortizable over the period
in which excess profits will result from the vendor's management, see FINNEY & Mn.ILE
506-07; PATON, ADvANCED ACCOUNTING 409-10 (1947). For arguments favoring and dis-
favoring depreciable goodwill, see DODD & BAKER, CORPORATIONS 1101-03 (2d ed. 1951)
(collecting citations).
10. See FINNEY & MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING--AvANCED 335 (4th ed. 1952).
11. If the taxpayer is not a dealer in securities and his shares of stock are not held
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, his stock constitutes a capital
asset. Rev. Rul. 56-153, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 166, 168-69. See also Hamlin's Trust v. Com-
missioner, 209 F.2d 761, 762 (10th Cir. 1954), affirming 19 T.C. 718 (1953) ; Abraham L.
Berman, P-H 1955 T.C. Mem. Dec. fT 551.13.
12. See note 11 supra. Stock could not be a capital asset if it were depreciable. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(2).
13. See note 8 supra.
14. See, e.g., Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1936) ; Hamlin's Trust v. Commis-
sioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Cox v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1934) ;
cf. Beal's Estate v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1936). But see Sidney Alper,
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In Richard Ulhnan,15 this dilemma confronted the joint owners of three
corporations who, on selling their stock, executed seven-year covenants not to
compete.' 6 After agreeing to $1,000,000 as the total purchase price, the vendee
suggested allocating $400,000 to the covenants.' 7 The vendors, fearful of losing
the sale, agreed to an apportionment of $350,000 to the covenants and $650,000
to the cost of the stock.' 8 When capital gains treatment was sought for the
full $1,000,000, the Tax Court held the $350,000 ordinary income on two
grounds. That the covenant was separately bargained for was considered evi-
dence of its severability from goodwill. 19 In addition, the court postulated that
stockholders cannot own corporate goodwill and concluded that proceeds from
the sale of a shareholder's-as distinguished from a sole proprietor's-cove-
nant cannot be income from the sale of goodwill but only compensation for
personal services, taxable as ordinary income.2 0
Under present law, each of the two grounds on which Ulhman rests is in-
sufficient in itself to support the result. The fact that stockholders have no
direct proprietary interest in corporate goodwill does not, standing alone, make
the covenant price ordinary income; in the absence of a stated allocation to
stock and covenant, courts have attributed the entire purchase price to the
stock, taxable at capital gains rates.2' Nor does mere agreement by the parties
on a separate price for the covenant, without more, produce ordinary income
taxation.22 And since failure to fix a price may result in a judicially deter-
mined covenant value taxed as ordinary income, 23 neither inclusion nor omis-
P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. II 56271 (court ignored contractual allocation on ground that
covenant had not been separately dealt with by parties) ; George H. Payne, 22 T.C. 526
(1954) (court refused to consider document specifying allocation because not signed and
agreed upon by all parties).
15. 29 T.C. 129 (1957).
16. Id. at 135-36.
17. Id. at 133.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 139-40. Courts often equate the concept of a covenant severable from good-
will with a separately bargained for covenant. See, e.g., George H. Payne, 22 T.C. 526,
531-32 (1954) ; Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17, 19 (1949). For cases indicating the contrary,
i.e., that a separately bargained for covenant may be part of goodwill, see note 22 infra.
20. 29 T.C. at 139-40.
21. Sidney Alper, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 56271 (despite allocation, covenant
ignored as not separately bargained for because necessary to assure transfer of goodwill;
no mention of stockholder status). George H. Payne, 22 T.C. 526 (1954) (allocation in
unsigned memorandum but not in formal contract; covenant not separately bargained for
held nonseverable from goodwill; no mention of stockholders lacking direct proprietary
interest).
22. Taylor, supra note 1, at 1060-61 (1954) ; see Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794
(1943) (despite agreement, capital gains treatment accorded entire profit after comparing
selling price with cost of entire assets, tangible and intangible, taken as a whole) ; see also
Joseph Faulkner, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 56039 (covenant nonseverable from assets
transferred) ; cf. Sidney Alper, supra note 21 (covenant "in consideration of" stated figure
nonetheless not separately bargained for).
23. See Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949) (goodwill and covenant held sever-
able). Courts have often held the covenant severable and permitted a vendee deprecia-
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sion of a covenant price by the parties has alone been the determining factor
in prior case law. Apparently unwilling to break new ground, the Ullman
court conformed with previous decisions by relying both on its finding that the
covenant was specially bargained for and on the status of taxpayers as share-
holder-vendors rather than proprietors.24
The Tax Court's distinction between proprietors and shareholders ignores
the actual function and effect of a covenant not to compete. The covenant
enables the vendee to acquire those customers who presumably will do business
with him so long as the covenantor does not become a competitor.2 5 Reputa-
tion and customer loyalty being elements of goodwill, 26 the covenant is a means
of protecting goodwill transferred with the business 27 and is enforceable only
if adopted for that purpose. 28 Since gpodwill can be equally protected whether
the covenant is that of a proprietor, stockholder or key employee, differences
arising from status are differences not in the operation of the covenant but in
the ease with which its value is ascertained. 29 In an arm's length transaction,
the price allocated to an employee's covenant-which protects goodwill sold
by another-is automatically taxed as ordinary income, for the price can only
reflect the value of the covenant, the taxpayer having conveyed nothing else.30
In contrast, the proprietor-vendor's covenant maintains transferred goodwill
which he owned directly, while the promise of the shareholder-vendor conserves
tion deductions when no allocation was made by the parties. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955) (lack of express segregation by parties
not binding) ; Frances Silberman, 22 T.C. 1240 (1954) (business had no goodwill) ; B. T.
Babbitt, Inc., 32 B.T.A. 693 (1935) (other assets had little value; primary purpose of
vendee was elimination of competition) ; see Christensen Mach. Co. v. United States, 73
Ct. Cl. 149, 50 F.2d 282 (1931) (excess over fair value of purchased stock depreciable).
More often, however, courts have accepted the absence of allocation as evidence of non-
severability and disallowed depreciation deductions. Radio Medford, Inc. v. United States,
150 F. Supp. 641 (D. Ore. 1957) (parties did not treat covenant having little value as
distinct item) ; Dauksch v. Busey, 125 F. Supp. 130, 133 (S.D. Ohio 1954) (parties did
not treat covenant separately from goodwill) ; D & H Bagel Bakery, Inc., P-H 1955 T.C.
Mem. Dec. U 55100 (covenant included only to guarantee goodwill) ; Lloyd H. Walker,
P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. f 54177 (covenant inserted only to protect other intangibles) ;
Jacques L. Ach, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 54349 (impossible to segregate covenant from
goodwill) ; Harold J. Burke, 18 T.C. 77 (1952) (covenant intended to protect purchase
of business) ; R. Bryson Jones, 17 B.T.A. 1213 (1929) (vendee purchased no intangible
asset other than goodwill); Market Supply Co., 3 B.T.A. 841 (1926) (impossible to
separate consideration).
24. For previous cases resting on the same dual grounds as Ullnan, see note 14 supra.
25. See note 1 supra.
26. See note 2 supra.
27. See INQ2uiRy INTO GOODWILL 716-19.
28. A covenant not to compete is unenforceable as against public policy if intended
for purposes other than protecting goodwill. 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1387 (1951) (col-
lecting cases) ; 5 WmLLsroN, CoNTRAcrs § 1641 (rev. ed. 1937) (collecting cases) ; see
Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not To Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 244 (1928).
29. See INQUIRY INTO GOODVIL 716-19.
30. See Estate of Mildred K. Hyde, 42 B.T.A. 738 (1940); Kaplan, Agreement Not
To Compete-Tax Consequences, 58 Dicx. L. REV. 387, 389 (1954).
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purchased stock-value flowing from goodwill. Thus, the close relation of the
proprietor or shareholder covenant to goodwill makes a price apportionment
between them difficult.31 Irrespective of the covenantor's identity or of com-
plexity in allocation, however, the covenant always fulfills precisely the same
function of safeguarding goodwill-without altering the essential nature of
either goodwill or the covenant.
Accordingly, a covenant with a separately stated price should always produce
ordinary income to the extent of that price regardless of the status of the cove-
nantor. Although a sale of property-goodwill-accompanies the covenant, the
covenant itself is not property and therefore not a capital asset, but a promise
of certain conduct supported by consideration. 32 Moreover, ordinary income
treatment for the covenant would create no special hardship. Favorable tax
rates accorded capital gains are intended to mitigate the burden of telescoping
into one year gain resulting from appreciation in value over many years and
to preserve liquidity for those capital items whose transfer might be unduly
discouraged by heavy taxation. 3 But a taxpayer wishing to sell a business, be-
sides being likely to have a reason for the transfer which outweighs the inhibit-
ing high taxation of incidental covenants, 34 can mitigate the harsh effects of
31. See, e.g., Jacques L. Ach, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 54349; Market Supply
Co., 3 B.T.A. 841, 843 (1926).
32. A capital asset, the sale or exchange of which results in capital gains or losses,
must be "property." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221. Capital gain may also be derived from
certain assets other than those capital assets defined by § 1221; but these other assets, in-
cluding real property used in taxpayer's trade or business and depreciable property iden-
tically used, must also be "property." Id. § 1231.
Congress did not define "income" in the 1954 Code but stated that "gross income
means all income from whatever source derived ....... Id. § 61 (a). No doubt exists
that proceeds from a contract, other than for a sale of capital assets or § 1231 assets,
constitute ordinary income under this broad statement. Covenants not to compete, when
unaccompanied by, or separable from, a sale of other assets, have consistently been held
to be compensation for services, taxable as ordinary income under present § 61(a) (1).
See, e.g., Beals' Estate v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1936). However, the
covenant becomes depreciable property in the hands of the vendee and, on sale of the busi-
ness by the vendee, proceeds from the sale of the covenant would probably be taxed as
capital gains. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
33. See MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOMIE 115 (rev. ed. 1945) ; NEW YORK STocI EXCHANGE,
TAXES, EQUITY CAPITAL, AND OUR ECONOMrIC CHALLENGES 38-40 (1953). Present tax
treatment of capital gains has been criticized on two grounds: the capital gains provisions
do not accomplish their intended goals, and the goals themselves are not desirable. Lowndes,
The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses Under the Federal Income Tax, 26 TEXAS L.
REv. 440 (1948) ; Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxa-
tion, 59 YALE L.J. 837, 1057 (1950). See 3B MERTENS § 22.01, at 5-8 n.3 (collecting cita-
tions).
34. For nontax motives inducing sale, see Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239
F.2d 322, 323 (5th Cir. 1956) (lack of time to devote to accounting practice); Richard
Ullman, 29 T.C. 129, 131 (1957) (ill health and bickering among owners) ; Lee Ruwitch,
22 T.C. 1053, 1054 (1954) (finding employment elsewhere) ; Richard Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251,
1253 (1950) (ill health); Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794, 799 (1943) (declining




telescoping by arranging to receive compensation for noncompetition in install-
ments over the life of the covenant.35 Such an arrangement should be satis-
factory to the vendee, who would make a smaller initial outlay while retaining
the ability to stop payments on breach of the covenant. The vendor, on the
other hand, might be apprehensive of vendee insolvency or simply prefer im-
mediate payment.30 Unwillingness to assume ordinary commercial risks, how-
ever, is an unpersuasive reason for conferring capital gains advantages on pay-
ments for nonperformance of activity which, if performed, would produce
ordinary income.37 Furthermore, capital gains rates would remain applicable
to the stock" of selling shareholders 38 and to transferred business assets other
than inventory and accounts receivable. 39
35. Whether the vendor is on the cash or accrual accounting basis, the covenant could
easily be worded so that his right to the yearly payment depends on his not having com-
peted that year; the vendee's obligation would not become enforceable until that time. See
2 MERTENS §§ 10.04, 12.61. Six-year proration of a lump sum payment could have been
achieved under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 452, but this section was retroactively repealed
by Act of June 15, 1955, c. 143, § 1, 69 STAT. 134. The Senate Finance Committee ex-
pected to report out new legislation concerning prepaid income, but none has been forth-
coming. S. REP. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955). For a discussion of § 452, see
Wagman, Sections 452 and 462: Stormy Past but a Bright Tomorrow, 33 TAXES 711
(1955).
36. A lump sum capital gain may still receive better tax treatment than ordinary in-
come spread over the years. For a taxpayer filing a joint return, application of the maxi-
mum capital gains rate of 25% to a lump sum payment results in lower tax than the appli-
cation of ordinary rates to yearly taxable income exceeding $18,000. See INT. Rxv. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 1(a), 1201, 1202.
37. See note 32 supra.
38. See note 11 supra. Prior to sale, a stockholder-vendor might covenant not to
compete with his corporation for a nominal consideration. This would raise the value of
the stock transferred to include the value of the covenant. On selling his stock, the vendor
would then receive the same amount for the stock as he would have received for the stock
plus a personal covenant. Thus, the price of the covenant becomes part of the price of
stock yielding capital gain to the vendor. The vendee, however, may dislike this arrange-
ment because he receives no depreciation deductions. See note 9 supra. And the courts
may well look through form to the substance of the transaction, especially if the share-
holder covenant to the corporation was executed solely for tax-avoidance purposes. See
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
To obtain a direct proprietary interest in business goodwill, the vendor might decide
to liquidate the corporation immediately prior to sale. Such liquidation would be treated
like a sale of stock-producing all capital gain. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, J 331. If sale to
the vendee occurs within one year after a plan of liquidation is adopted, the corporation
will not recognize any gain or loss on the sale. Id. § 337. And the vendor, if he sells the
assets immediately, receives no gain on the sale to vendee because his basis for the property
would presumably be the same as the sales price, i.e., fair market value. Id. § 335 (a).
(The vendor would not elect to postpone recognition of gain under § 333 since he plans
on selling immediately.) But the vendee may not be satisfied with the allocations to the
different assets. Moreover, if business were heavily dependent on personal qualities of
the stockholder, courts might hold that no goodwill was transferred to the stockholder
upon liquidation. M. M. Gordon, P-H 1950 T.C. Mem. Dec. 50061 (business continued
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Taxing the covenant as ordinary income and honoring the contracting
parties' price allocation would achieve predictability of tax treatment in an
area currently marked by needless uncertainty.40 Since vendor and vendee
ordinarily bargain with their net position after taxes in mind, the proposed
rule would avoid unnecessary disappointment of their legitimate expectations 4'
after liquidation as partnership by the former stockholders; -no goodwill transferred be-
cause business depended on personal attributes of the stockholders) ; Ruth M. Cullen, 14
T.C. 368 (1950). But see Estate of Ben R. Henderson, P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. 52301
(ignoring personal attributes of shareholder turned sole proprietor).
If the corporation were to sell its assets to the vendee with no plan of liquidation, or
after one year from the date of the plan, the stockholder's covenant would bring him per-
sonal income. See, e.g., Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794, 805 (1943). If the vendor
is a corporation selling assets of a subsidiary after liquidation, no gain or loss would be
recognized to the parent on liquidation. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 332. But on selling the
assets, the parent would recognize gain or loss and would ordinarily take the subsidiary's
basis for the liquidated assets, id. § 334(b) (1), unless the purchase of the subsidiary was
within two years of sale, thus activating the adjusted basis of the subsidiary's stock, id.
§ 334(b) (2). With either basis, the parent corporation, upon selling the assets to the
vendee, would be taxed as a sole proprietor selling his business. The covenant, if no price
is allocated to it, may therefore be transformed into capital gain, but the corporation
would receive ordinary income on the sale of inventory and accounts receivable.
39. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1221(1), 1221(4).
40. At present, no clearly defined standard exists by which vendors and vendees can
predict tax treatment accorded a covenant not to compete. Compare Richard Ullman, 29
T.C. 129 (1958) (stockholder-vendor ineligible for capital gains treatment of covenant),
with George H. Payne, 22 T.C. 526 (1954) (stockholder-vendor's covenant accorded capi-
tal gains). Compare Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954) (al-
location a ground for taxation of covenant as ordinary income), with Toledo Newspaper
Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943) (despite allocation, covenant found nonseverable from goodwill
and taxed as capital gains). Compare Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d
322 (5th Cir. 1956) (absence of allocation a ground for giving capital gains), with Rodney
B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949) (despite failure to allocate, covenant found severable from
goodwill and taxed as ordinary income). Compare Andrew Newman, Inc., P-H 1957 T.C.
Mem. Dec. ff 57224 (allocation evidence that covenant is independent of goodwill; vendee
may depreciate), with Toledo Blade Co. v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950) (despite allocation, covenant indistinguishable from goodwill;
vendee may not depreciate). Conpare Radio Medford, Inc. v. United States, 150 F. Supp.
641 (D. Ore. 1957) (failure to allocate a ground for denying vendee right to depreciate),
with Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955)
(despite failure to allocate, covenant had independent value; vendee may depreciate).
Attempts to base tax treatment on the relation between covenant and goodwill neces-
sarily produce unpredictability because of the vagueness of the standard. Compare Estate
of Masquelette v. Commissioner, supra, with Rodney B. Horton, supra. More frequently
than not, however, if the vendor was under compulsion to sell and the covenant seems to
be of little value, courts treat the covenant as nonseverable from goodwill and allow capi-
tal gains treatment. See Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, supra; Lee Ruwitch,
22 T.C. 1053 (1954) ; Richard Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950) ; Toledo Newspaper Co., supra.
41. For articles suggesting ways for vendors and vendees to work within the present
framework, see Maddrea, Both Buyer and Seller Face Tax Traps in Covenants Not To
Compete, 6 J. TAXATION 86, 87 (1957) (to insure depreciation for vendee, allocation should
not be out of line with other assets or with income) ; Taylor, Covenants Not To Compete:
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while saving the Commissioner the difficult task of attempting to apportion
between covenant and goodwill or stock.42 Thus, Ullman is to be commended
for confirming the principle that allocation by stockholder-vendors results in
ordinary income for the stipulated price of the covenant.43 In simultaneously
basing the decision on the vendor's shareholder status, however, the court
supplied inconsistent criteria for cases involving either shareholder-vendors
with an unallocated price or nonshareholder-vendors with an allocated figure.
Specifically, the court's reliance on allocation contradicts prior nonshareholder
cases ignoring an allocation ;44 and the court's statement that a stockholder-
vendor cannot receive capital gains for a covenant conflicts with previous non-
allocation cases according capital gains treatment to shareholders.45 Ullnan
therefore lays the ground for later decisions to hold that stipulated allocations
do not reflect true values or, in the opposite situation, that failure to allocate
must be remedied by judicial apportionment. 4
Had the Ullman court viewed allocation by the parties as the sole determin-
ing factor, future vendors and vendees irrespective of status would know the
tax consequences of covenants and could plan accordingly. Moreover, tax rev-
enue would not be significantly impaired by failure to allocate or by allocations
not reflecting true values. No price for the covenant, or an understated one,
though increasing the proportion of capital gains for the vendor, reduces de-
Consulting Arrangements, Adjustments to Purchase Price, N.Y.U. 12TH INsT. ox FED.
TAX. 1047, 1063 (1954) (vendee should employ vendor on a consulting arrangement and
make covenant incident thereto). See also Kamens & Ancier, Tax Consequences of a
Covenant Not To Compete, 27 TAXES 891 (1949) ; Kaplan, supra note 30; McCandless,
Tax Consequences of Covenants Not To Compete, N.Y.U. 8TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 880,
888 (1950).
42. No exception should be made to the proposed rule. Assuming the vendor is aware
of the tax consequences accorded a covenant not to compete, this element is one of many
considered in negotiations looking to maximum gain after taxes. Thus, the vendor might
receive a higher total price in exchange for the tax concession he made on the covenant.
Excessive time and money would be lost if the Commissioner attempted to do more than
ascertain that the negotiations were conducted at arm's length. A hard case is presented
by the vendor who did not plan on competing, was ignorant of the tax consequences of
allocation, and was forced to allocate by a vendee with stronger bargaining power. Such
cases are likely to be too infrequent, however, to justify making an exception which would
invite litigation by taxpayers seeking to take advantage of indefinite judicial precedent.
Furthermore, government revenues should not be impaired to give special capital gains
treatment to people receiving poor tax advice. Similarly, if the vendee were ignorant of
tax consequences, and the unallocated covenant had a provable value, an exception in his
favor should be denied. But see Comment, 8 STAN. L. REv. 485, 492-93 (1956) (arguing
that vendee should be allowed to depreciate covenant if he can prove its value, even in
absence of allocation).
43. See note 14 mspra.
44. See cases cited note 22 supra.
45. See cases cited note 21 supra.
46. For cases in which the courts did not follow the stipulated allocations but instead
placed their own values on the covenants in question, see note 22 supra. For a case in
which the court allocated after the parties had failed to do so, see Rodney B. Horton, 13
T.C. 143 (1949).
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preciation deductions available to the vendee. Conversely, excessive deprecia-
tion deductions produced by undue allocation to the covenant are balanced by
the increased amount of ordinary income received by the vendor. 47 While
parties in different tax brackets may achieve an overall tax saving by careful
allocation, potential revenue loss does not appear great enough to justify ex-
penditures for investigation and litigation on the question of true value.48
47. See text at notes 7-13 supra.
48. For instance, application of ordinary income rates to the vendor may increase his
tax by an amount greater than the benefit the vendee would receive by depreciation deduc-
tions. In this case, the vendor may be able to obtain a zero allocation to the covenant by
lowering the price enough to compensate the vendee for his lost deductions. But the gov-
ernment's revenue loss through the lower tax on the vendor will be in large part restored
through the inability of the vendee to obtain depreciation deductions. A vendee may
benefit from depreciation deductions in an amount greater than the vendor would save
by getting capital gains instead of ordinary income. The vendee may then pay a higher
price to compensate the vendor for his higher tax. Again, the higher price and ordinary
income treatment for the vendor will restore most of the revenue lost through excessive
vendee depreciation deductions.
